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A B S T R A C T
The concept of social licence to operate (SLO) is an increasingly popular tool for companies to manage their
relations with the local communities. SLO is very seldom used in the nuclear sector, which has nevertheless
applied similar approaches, under notions such as partnership and participatory governance. This article ex-
plores the speciﬁc challenges that the application of SLO faces in the nuclear waste management (NWM) sector,
by applying an often-used SLO framework of Boutilier and Thomson to illustrative case studies concerning
nuclear waste repository projects in Finland, France and Sweden. Among the speciﬁcities of this sector, the
article focuses on the central role of the state in the governance of a project designed as a local solution to a
national, even a global problem, entailing extremely long-term challenges, in a context when the state has a
vested interest in the project obtaining an SLO. The article suggests that state-related elements be added to the
four key criteria of the Boutilier and Thomson framework, which consists of economic and socio-political le-
gitimacy, and interactional and institutionalised trust. To account for the diversity of settings, such as the ‘high-
trust’ contexts of Finland and Sweden and the French ‘society of mistrust’, further analysis and conceptual
reﬁnement are needed, especially concerning the multiple dimensions of trust and mistrust, the relationships
between legal, political, and social licences, and the speciﬁc challenges of intergenerational justice in SLO work.
1. Introduction
With its roots in extractive and forestry industries, including energy
and natural resource sectors, the concept of Social licence to operate
(SLO) has become a preferred tool for an increasing number of com-
panies and organisations, operating in various sectors, to manage their
community relations and reputational risks [1, p. 1779; 2–7]. Whilst
necessary, compliance with statutory regulations seldom suﬃces to
meet the societal expectations on industrial projects [5, p. 473]. In
broad terms, SLO denotes the approval or acceptance that the public or
a community of stakeholders grants to the operations of a company or
industry – to a speciﬁc project or land use change [1, p. 1779; 8, p. 346;
9, p. 61; 10, pp. 489–490]. SLO can help a company by alleviating
social, economic and political risks stemming from local opposition;
consolidating local support for a project; avoiding delays; eliminating
unviable projects and siting alternatives early; and preventing a decline
of the market value of the company's products [11,6]. For the aﬀected
communities, SLO oﬀers a well-recognised concept that aﬀords salience
and legitimacy for their views and demands.
In this article, we explore the speciﬁc challenges that the application
of SLO faces in the nuclear waste management (NWM) sector, by ap-
plying one of the most well-known SLO frameworks, the “arrowhead
model” of Boutilier and Thomson [12; see also 1,11] to illustrative case
studies concerning nuclear waste repository projects in Finland, France
and Sweden. The article seeks neither to compare the degree to which
the three projects have obtained an SLO, nor to test the framework of
Boutilier and Thomson. Instead, we highlight the particularly central
and complex roles of the state in nuclear waste policy. We then suggest
ways of amending SLO frameworks in general, and the Boutilier &
Thomson framework in particular, to better account for the multiple
roles of the state. Our cases provide a non-exhaustive sample of real-
world examples of the s of the state in waste management organisa-
tions’ eﬀorts to obtain an SLO.
While SLO is usually applied to private sector activities, a diverse
range government bodies are involved in regulation, surveillance, im-
plementation, R&D, communication and ownership related to nuclear
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waste governance. Recent research has highlighted how governance
and institutions at multiple levels shape the acquisition of an SLO [e.g.
13–15], yet we argue that SLO theory and practice need to pay greater
attention to the roles of the state. The extremely long timescales and
risks involved in NWM set these projects apart from ‘conventional’ SLO
projects: high-level radioactive waste needs to remain isolated from
living organisms for up to hundreds of thousands of years. This ac-
centuates the roles of the state, as a lasting albeit not eternal institution,
mediating between the public, private and community interests. In-
sights from our case examples in the nuclear waste sector bear re-
levance for nuclear energy sector more generally, but also for climate
policy, given the centrality of the state in dealing with the associated
intergenerational challenges [e.g. 16, pp. 54–83].
The next section describes the research methods and justiﬁes the
choice of the case studies. Section three brieﬂy deﬁnes SLO and its
challenges, and presents the ‘arrowhead’ framework of Boutilier and
Thomson [12], which provides a basis for the presentation of our ar-
guments. Section four describes the speciﬁc and complex roles of the
state in NWM, while section ﬁve presents our three illustrative cases.
Section six illustrates our arguments by applying the Boutilier and
Thomson framework to the case studies. Section seven concludes by
summarising the key aspects that need to be considered in further work
to integrate the ‘state dimension’, and suggests themes for further re-
search.
2. Methods and choice of the illustrative case studies
Three features justify our choice of the illustrative cases. First, the
roles of the state, and the relationships between various key actors at
diﬀerent levels of nuclear waste governance diﬀer signiﬁcantly between
the three countries. Second, contrasting the Nordic ‘high-trust’ societies
[e.g. 17] and the French “society of mistrust” [18,19] is particularly
relevant, given the central role of trust as a key element of SLO. Third,
these repository projects are nearer to implementation than similar
projects in any other country. In terms of case study research [20, p. 30]
our sample therefore represents a mix of “diverse cases” (as to the roles
of the state), the “most diﬀerent” cases (the Nordics vs. France in terms
of trust), while being the “most similar” with regard to the advance-
ment of the projects (three forerunners in NWM).
The article draws primarily on existing academic literature on SLO
and on NWM in our three case study countries. Our choice to con-
centrate on the role of the state followed from ﬁndings from the initial
literature survey, as well as from discussions with experts working on
social aspects of NWM. These revealed that SLO was nearly absent from
the vocabulary of NWM actors, and that SLO literature has thus far paid
scarce attention to the role of the state. The secondary NWM literature,
which served as the core material for the study, included also our own
earlier extensive work concerning the Finnish, French and Swedish
nuclear sector, on SLO-related topics such as repository site selection,
local community perceptions, and the role of the host municipality
[21–26]; long-term challenges of memory conservation [27]; commu-
nity beneﬁt schemes [28–30]; socioeconomics of NWM [31–35]; citizen
participation and deliberation [36–38]; as well as politics and regula-
tion of nuclear energy and NWM [39–43]. Data from opinion surveys
provided additional insights especially concerning the levels of trust. As
a complementary source, especially for the French case, we used the
SLO-relevant material from the semi-structured stakeholder interviews
conducted by the ﬁrst author in earlier research on NWM. These in-
terviews concerned NWM topics closely related to SLO, including no-
tably citizen participation, socioeconomic evaluation of the repository
project and the associated beneﬁt schemes (in all three countries),
public communication (Finland and France), and trust in NWM policy
(Finland and Sweden). In Finland, ﬁfteen interviews were conducted
between April 2009 and August 2018; in France, 34 interviews in
2013–2014 and in 2019; and in Sweden, twelve interviews in 2013 and
2015. In France, most interviewees were local and departmental-level
actors, but also national-level representatives from the nuclear industry,
central government, safety authorities, and NGOs were interviewed. In
Finland, the interviewees included representatives from the NWM
company, the nuclear operators, the national authorities, researchers,
and NGOs. The Swedish interviewees represented the NWM company,
the safety authority, NGOs, the National Council on Nuclear Waste,
local politicians, academics, and independent consultants. Annex 1
gives further detail on the interviews. On all three countries, numerous
informal discussions over the years with stakeholders and experts
provided further inputs.
To identify and organise the relevant information in our material,
we used as a guide the ‘arrowhead’ framework of Boutilier and
Thomson [12], which we present in section four. This allowed us to
structure the analysis and the presentation in section six according to
the four key elements of the framework: economic and socio-political
legitimacy, as well as interactional and institutionalised trust. When
analysing the data from multiple sources, we sought to identify the
speciﬁc roles that the state played in our three cases, in the key pro-
cesses falling within these four categories of SLO criteria.
3. What is a social licence to operate?
After twenty years of use, SLO lacks a standardised deﬁnition and is
applied somewhat diﬀerently depending on the sector and context in
question [44]. SLO constitutes a metaphor [e.g. 7], yet scholars have
developed elaborate means of measuring SLO, for example via tailor-
made questionnaires [e.g. 11,45]. A general consensus nevertheless
prevails over the key ideas: an SLO is granted by the local community
hosting a project [e.g. 46], it entails processes of acceptance and ap-
proval of industry's activities, and it is constructed via dynamic inter-
action between community, stakeholders and companies [44]. Al-
though usually employed for industrial projects, Jijelava and Vanclay
[47] applied SLO to humanitarian NGO action. As a ‘soft contract’ [48,
p. 1], SLO complements and interacts with the statutory legal licence
granted by the authorities, and the ‘political’ licence (PLO) denoting the
degree to which national decision-makers are in favour of the project in
question [49,46]. Intricately linked with the (economic) development
agenda of the state, PLO can result from trade-oﬀs with issues unrelated
to the project in question [53]. While PLO alone would generally suﬃce
in authoritarian settings, state's development objectives can override or
at least threaten SLO even in democratic regimes [49].
An SLO needs to be constantly maintained, and align with the
changing values and objectives of the community [e.g. 1, p. 1779].
Multiple SLOs, or several ‘sub-licences’ would be needed to account for
the heterogeneity among the diﬀerent parts of community [cf. 50, pp.
189–190; 6, p. 1084]. For example, a project may have an SLO from
municipal leaders and local businesses, but not from citizen move-
ments.
As a rule, an SLO is granted to a speciﬁc project or activity – a
company may have an SLO for one of its projects, but not for another
[1, p. 1781]. Sometimes the ‘owner’ of an SLO is extended to cover the
company and its local operations [12, p. 2] or even an entire industry
branch [e.g. 51, p. 45]. In practice, when considering a project and its
SLO, citizens draw on their earlier experience concerning the company
and industry in question, as well as on their ideological convictions
[e.g. 25,15,52, p. 45]. In this sense, SLO contrasts with the more ‘cal-
culative’ political licence [53].
3.1. The four-ladder model of SLO: legitimacy and trust as the key
prerequisites
To illustrate our argument about the roles of the state, we apply an
oft-used SLO framework, developed by Thomson and Boutilier [1; see
also 12,54,6,7,55]. Since NWM is not always the responsibility of a
private company, we replace the habitual SLO term ‘company’ by ‘or-
ganisation’.
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The framework distinguishes four levels in the formation of an SLO.
At the lowest level, the community rejects or withdraws the SLO from
the organisation, whereas at the second level, it accepts and tolerates
the project. At the third level, the community explicitly approves the
project and encourages the continuation of the activity. At the top of
the ladder, the community perceives the project as its own, as an in-
tegral part of its identity and values. We rely on a slightly more reﬁned
'arrowhead' version, presented in Fig. 1, in which the four levels
(withdrawal, acceptance, approval, psychological identiﬁcation) form a
continuum, and constitute the key elements shaping the acquisition of
an SLO: economic legitimacy, socio-political legitimacy, interactional
trust, and institutionalised trust [12, pp. 3–6].
3.1.1. Economic and socio-political legitimacy: distributive and procedural
justice
Legitimacy represents “the acceptance of the project by the host
community especially in terms of its fairness” [6, p. 1078]. Economic
legitimacy – the minimum requirement for acceptance – relates to
distributive justice, i.e. citizens’ perception that costs and beneﬁts of the
project are shared equitably. Community beneﬁt schemes often seek to
ensure this kind of legitimacy.
Socio-political legitimacy can allow a project to win true approval.
It posits procedural justice as a key concern, requiring that the orga-
nisation shows willingness to protect the community's social, environ-
mental and cultural ways of life from harmful impacts. The organisation
should inform the community about its activities, listen to community
concerns, establish and explain the project's rationale, and demonstrate
that the beneﬁts clearly outweigh the downsides [1, p. 1785; 12, p. 4;
7]. Procedural justice is ultimately anchored in international and na-
tional law, via legislative acts such as the Aarhus Convention on access
to information, participation and justice; Environmental Impact As-
sessment and Social Impact Assessment procedures; or laws governing
access to and ownership of land [46,7,32].
3.1.2. Interactional trust: keeping the promises
Legitimacy is a foundation for mutual trust, that is, a situation in
which parties voluntarily accept their vulnerability to actions by others
[1, p. 1786]. In the case of SLO, trust implies conﬁdence by the com-
munity members that the organisation will always act in the commu-
nity's best interests [1, p. 1786; 6, p. 1078]. An organisation should
appear as honest and sincere in its communication and attempts to keep
its promises but must also demonstrate that it has the requisite tech-
nical, ﬁnancial and other resources [e.g. 6, p. 1078; 7,56, p. 2645].
While listening and communicating suﬃce to ensure legitimacy, in-
teractional trust requires responsiveness to citizens’ concerns and
views [1, p. 1785; 57, p. 141], mutual dialogue, respect for local ways
of life, and a shared vision of the future of the region [12, p. 4; 10].
Concrete measures include envisioning new development goals with the
community; capacity building and economic development; and dele-
gation of aspects of the project to the community, allowing shared
ownership of risks and opportunities [1, p. 1786]. For participatory
governance to build trust, citizens must be informed about how their
views have been taken into account in decision-making.
3.1.3. Institutionalised trust: psychological identiﬁcation with “our project”
SLO at its strongest implies institutionalised trust or “full trust”,
that is, a situation in which relations between the community and the
organisation are “based on an enduring regard for each other's inter-
ests” [12, p. 4; 6, p. 1079; 1, p. 1784; 11]. Both parties then take trust
for granted, the citizens psychologically identify themselves with the
values and interests of the organisation – the organisation and the
community see each other as partners, as "good buddies" [54,6]. The
community actively supports and adopts the project as its own, takes
pride of it, and designs and implements its own activities as part of the
project [6, p. 1079].
While interactional trust is temporary and directly linked to a spe-
ciﬁc project, institutionalised trust is more stable over time, although
ultimately subject to the general ‘rule’ of trust being hard to earn, but
easy to lose [58, p. 677]. Institutionalised trust can be seen as an out-
come of long-term interaction of the community with its environment
and stakeholders, trust-building measures by the project organisation
being only one among many causal factors.
The 'arrowhead model' (Fig. 1) illustrates how a company may attain
approval for its project in the presence of either: 1) economic legitimacy
and socio-political legitimacy; or 2) economic legitimacy and interac-
tional trust. On the basis of their empirical analysis, Boutilier and
Thomson [12, p. 4] concluded that economic legitimacy is a minimum
requirement for an SLO, whereas full/institutionalised trust is possible
only when all three other key criteria are present at the same time.
4. The vital role of the state in nuclear waste management
Although facing social acceptability challenges similar to those of
the extractive industries – the most common ‘user’ of an SLO – the
nuclear industry has only recently shown interest in the concept [59].1
It has nevertheless applied similar approaches, especially in nuclear
Fig. 1. The four factors that determine the proportions of stakeholders at each level (source: adapted from 12, pp. 2–5).
1 With the notable exception of uranium mining, where SLO is a well-estab-
lished notion e.g. [63,64].
M. Lehtonen, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 61 (2020) 101353
3
waste repository siting, under denominations such as local partner-
ships, or broad public and stakeholder participation [e.g. 37,60–62].
Terms such as partnership and stakeholder conﬁdence have been in-
stitutionalised internationally, e.g. in the activities of the Forum on
Stakeholder Conﬁdence (FSC) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency,2
and nationally, in regulatory frameworks via mandatory Environmental
Impact Assessment procedures, multistakeholder expert committees,
national commissions of public debate (e.g. in France, Canada, and
Italy), local liaison committees, and community beneﬁt schemes, for
example. These approaches face similar challenges as SLO, including
the risk of participation being used for merely instrumental purposes
[e.g. 65,37,66], SLO legitimising “questionable company practices be-
hind an SLO veneer of respectability” [53], and beneﬁt schemes being
denounced as a form of bribery [e.g. 67,68,30]. Participation, part-
nerships and eﬀorts at gaining an SLO may then fail in their shared
main objective, that of engendering trust.
Despite these similarities, nuclear waste disposal projects exhibit
speciﬁc features that bring to the fore the roles of the state, and com-
plicate the key questions of “who should grant an SLO, to whom/what,
and on which grounds”. While industry projects are typically designed
to generate proﬁt for private business enterprises and to foster national,
regional and local socioeconomic development, nuclear waste re-
positories aim to provide a local solution to a national – even a
global – problem. This public-interest nature of nuclear waste projects
complicates the arbitration between the SLO and the political licence
[49], accentuating the role of the state as a guardian of the public
interest.
The extremely long timespan of NWM adds an inter-temporal aspect
to the already complex arbitrations between the diﬀerent types of li-
cences, and between the local, national and global levels of governance.
Can the present local community legitimately grant an SLO to a project
that can have implications for innumerable generations of future re-
sidents in that community? SLO scholars have argued that the concept
can reﬂect the concerns of broader (e.g. multinational) civil society
[1,8]. In principle, an SLO can therefore address intergenerational
concerns, which are central in NWM projects. Speciﬁc ways of dealing
with intergenerational justice in SLO theory and practice would merit
a separate treatment, and will not be addressed in detail in this article.
SLO scholars have drawn attention to the role of complex govern-
ance and institutional arrangements in shaping SLO processes and
outcomes [e.g. 8,13]. Heﬀron et al. [46] underline that although an
SLO is essentially an informal contract, law is often crucial in giving
eﬀect to SLO, for example through minimum legal standards. However,
extant SLO literature has seldom addressed the internal heterogeneity
of the state, and, by implication, its various roles in SLO processes. The
government is sometimes treated merely as a third-party regulator [e.g.
48], or an actor that tends to unduly complicate SLO processes. Yates
and Hovarth [69] illustrated how local governments can help the pro-
ject owner to identify the key stakeholder groups. From a slightly dif-
ferent angle, an SLO has been portrayed as a prerequisite for, but in-
dependent from, the formal legal licence granted by the government
[13]. Mundeva [48] highlights social inclusion policies as vital de-
terminants of SLO processes, while Rauﬄet [51] stresses the ways in
which the state can actively promote private-sector projects in pursuit
of economic and territorial development. The complexity of the very
notion of ‘the state’ is particularly pronounced in the NWM sector, for
instance because the state is not only a key actor in energy policy, but in
some cases (e.g. France) also the project owner seeking an SLO for a
repository. Furthermore, the sub-national public actors, at diﬀerent
levels of governance, are often torn between multiple loyalties towards
the state on one hand and their local constituencies on the other.
This heterogeneity also stems from the distinct patterns of eco-
nomic interests involved, in particular the close ties between nuclear
energy policy and NWM, and the contentious nature of nuclear power
in public discussion. Even in the most economically liberal countries,
the state has, since the early years of nuclear development, laid the
essential foundations for the success of the industry, via state-funded
R&D, communication and knowledge-creation, regulation, as well as
direct and indirect economic and institutional support to an industry
initially born out of the eﬀorts to construct nuclear weapons. This has
created a dense network of partly transnational links between the in-
dustry, government institutions, local and national politicians, tax-
payers, and voters. As an enduring threat to the continued use of nu-
clear energy, the unresolved ‘waste problem’ further reinforces these
connections.
5. SLO challenges in the nuclear waste sector: illustration via
examples from France, Finland, and Sweden
5.1. France: a state-led and conﬂict-ridden project
The planned repository, Cigéo,3 to be built in clay host rock, would
receive the high- and medium-level waste from the 58 reactors cur-
rently supplying over 70% of France's electricity consumption. Andra,
the national radioactive waste management agency, plans to start
construction in 2022 and pilot stage operations in around 2030 [70, p.
56]. Via Andra, the state is therefore the ultimate agent seeking to
obtain an SLO, although the ﬁnancing for the project comes via taxes
levied on the largely state-owned waste producers: EDF, Orano (until
late 2017 Areva), and the national nuclear R&D agency, CEA.4 The
nuclear sector enjoys a special place among state interests, as a major
export sector, a key actor in the modernisation of the country since the
1950s, and a source of national pride [71].
The repository project has a long and conﬂict-ridden history.
Andra's initial site investigations in the late 1980s generated vehement
local opposition [e.g. 72,65]. To unblock the subsequent stalemate, the
government reopened the search to include three diﬀerent RWM op-
tions, and opened the discussion to a wide range of actors [72]. The
ground-breaking Waste Act 1991 [73] introduced the concept of re-
versible geological disposal and community beneﬁt schemes. It also led
to the establishment of multistakeholder commissions, external evalu-
ating bodies, and local information and liaison committees (CLIS).
These added further complexity to the governance of the project, un-
derpinned by the French politico-administrative system, which involves
two parallel lines cutting across various tiers of governance: state ad-
ministration on one hand, and autonomous territorial politico-admin-
istrative structures on the other. The safety authority, ASN, is supported
by the technical safety expert organisation, IRSN.
Towards the late 1990s, local conﬂict aggravated again, in the
context of declining public trust in the governance of risk,5 and fol-
lowing government decision to designate as a site for an underground
research laboratory (URL) Bure – a small village in a remote, rural,
sparsely populated, and socio-economically declining region in the east
of France [41]. The other sites eliminated one by one, Bure soon be-
came also the de facto only candidate for hosting a repository [65]. The
National Commission on Public Debate (CNDP) organised mandatory
public consultations on radioactive waste policy in 2005–06 and on the
Cigéo project in 2013–14. In 2019, it organised yet another similar
consultation, on the national strategy on managing radioactive waste
2 The Canadian NEA delegates had mentioned social licence in some of the
Agency's meetings (Personal e-mail communication, a former NEA consultant,
14 March 2018).
3 Centre industriel de stockage géologique.
4 The French state owns over 80% of the shares of EDF, the operator of
France's 58 nuclear reactors, and more than 90% of those of the full-fuel-cycle
nuclear company, Orano.
5 Including the widespread perception that the government had sought to
conceal the true extent of Chernobyl fallout in France [42].
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and spent fuel (PNGMDR).
Most parliamentarians, departmental authorities, business organi-
sations, trade unions, and local mayors are in favour of the project,
conditional on guarantees of safety and transparency [74, p. 7]. Some
opposition persists, including from a handful of mayors of the small
rural communes in the immediate vicinity of the installation. Increasing
contestation by local and national activists has recently led to clashes
between the police and the demonstrators.
5.2. Finland: advancing smoothly, to become the ﬁrst in the world?
The industry-owned Finnish NWM company, Posiva, hopes to start
disposing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Olkiluoto, in the municipality
of Eurajoki, in the 2020s, almost on schedule established in a 1983
government Decision-in-Principle (DiP). The highly technical approach
to site selection generated local opposition in the late 1980s and early
1990s. In 1994, a law amendment banned SNF exports from Finland,
and thus spurred the two nuclear power operators, the state electricity
company IVO (today, Fortum Power and Heat Ltd), and the privately-
owned TVO, to set up a joint waste management company, Posiva [21].
The government today holds about 51% of the shares of Fortum, which
operates in ten countries, with emphasis on the Nordic and Baltic area,
Poland, Russia, and India [75]. TVO is owned by a consortium of power
and industrial companies, with Pohjolan Voima (57%) and Fortum
(28%) as its largest shareholders [76]. The governance arrangements
are simple compared to the French one, with the Ministry of Economic
Aﬀairs and Employment responsible for policy planning and co-
ordination (including in the processes of Environmental Impact As-
sessment, EIA), the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) as
the main regulatory body, the highly autonomous municipalities as the
key local-level actors, and Parliament as the ultimate decision-maker.
In response to the 1994 Act on Environmental Impact Assessment
Procedure [77], which made an EIA mandatory, Posiva started planning
what was to become in the prevailing context an unprecedentedly
participatory and ambitious EIA [78,79], going beyond mere legal re-
quirements. Four candidate sites were studied, yet Posiva soon focused
on the two nuclear communities, Eurajoki and Loviisa, expecting these
to be the most willing to host a repository [80, p. 95]. Approval by the
Eurajoki municipal council in 2000 led to a favourable Parliament DiP
in 2001, followed by another DiP in 2002 for the construction of a new
TVO-owned Olkiluoto 3 reactor in the same municipality. Posiva
started constructing the underground rock characterisation facility in
2004, and obtained in 2015 construction licence on the same site for the
ﬁnal repository constructed according to the Swedish KBS-3 concept in
granite bedrock [43]. The repository is to receive SNF from the four
nuclear reactors and from the Olkiluoto 3 – foreseen to start operating
in 2020 and to bring the share of nuclear in electricity supply from the
present 27% to about 45% [81]. At the time of writing, the fate of the
SNF from the planned sixth reactor remains uncertain [24].
5.3. Sweden: trust-building via dialogue and municipal power
The Nuclear Stipulation Act from 1977 imposed upon the Swedish
nuclear operators a legal obligation to demonstrate an “absolutely safe”
solution to the waste problem, before new reactors could be licenced
[82,83]. Since then, the future of nuclear power in Sweden has been
tied to the ability of the industry to demonstrate the possibility of such a
solution [82,60]. The initial search for a willing site by the private
industry-owned waste management company, SKB, in the 1980s and
early 1990s proved unsuccessful in the face of public opposition [84].
The state-industry relations are complex and intricate, extending out-
side of the Swedish borders [82]. SKB's shareholders are the 100%
state-owned Vattenfall, Forsmarks Kraftgrupp (with Vattenfall as its
majority owner), OKG, and Sydkraft Nuclear Power [85]. The Finnish,
mostly state-owned, Fortum owns shares in Swedish nuclear power
stations, while other Swedish companies owning shares in the country's
nuclear plants are Fortum's subsidiaries.6 Sweden was one of the early
adopters of nuclear power, and the industry has played a signiﬁcant
role in the country's economy [83]. Following a referendum in 1980,
the government committed to phasing out nuclear power, yet the
schedule has been repeatedly delayed. Eight nuclear reactors today
provide about 40% of the country's electricity [86]. The governance
structure resembles that of Finland, with strong municipal autonomy as
a founding pillar. However, unlike in Finland, the provincial authorities
have a coordinating role in the EIA, and the licencing system entails
two ‘tracks’” – one based on the Nuclear Activities Act, and another on
the Environmental Code [87].
In 1993–2000, SKB conducted feasibility studies in eight munici-
palities. Like Posiva, it ended up concentrating its eﬀorts on nuclear
communities, of which Oskarshamn and Östhammar proved to be the
most eager to engage [84]. Hosts for nuclear power stations and re-
positories for long-lived and short-lived radioactive waste – and with a
largely favourable local opinion – the municipalities engaged in com-
petition for the project. However, they also collaborated closely, con-
stituting a joint negotiating force towards SKB, including via highly
elaborate and participatory multistakeholder dialogue, partly in con-
nection with the mandatory EIA consultations [88,26]. In 2009, SKB
chose Östhammar as the repository site, while Oskarshamn would re-
ceive the encapsulation plant. SKB submitted a construction licence
application in 2011, yet the ﬁnal decision is still pending, notably be-
cause of doubts concerning the corrosion rate of the copper-clad waste
containers, and the ﬁnancing of the facility. The Swedish example is
frequently portrayed internationally as a model for democratic and
dialogical planning and decision-making in the area of NWM [60].
6. The roles of the state: analysis via the four elements of SLO
In this section, we will illustrate the roles of the state and long-term
risks in nuclear-waste sector SLO, by applying to our three cases the
concepts presented above.
6.1. Economic legitimacy and bribery allegations: tax bonuses and legally
mandatory or privately negotiated beneﬁt schemes
Since the designation of Bure as the host for a URL in France, the
two departments (Meuse and Haute-Marne) sharing the facility have
received substantial support (today, EUR 30 million per year for each
department) in the form of legally mandatory beneﬁt schemes [89]. The
schemes – designed to help the region prepare for the arrival of the
repository – are governed at the departmental level by multistakeholder
bodies, GIPs,7 and ﬁnanced via charges levied on the waste producers
[89]. As our interviews revealed, even many 'pro-Cigéo' mayors contest
the fairness of the distribution of the GIP beneﬁts, not least following
the government decision to extend the range of beneﬁciaries from the
33 small communes nearest to the facility to more than 300 sur-
rounding municipalities [90, p. 26] hosting about 168 000 inhabitants.
Our interviewees – project opponents and defenders alike – blamed
GIPs for ineﬃciency, wasting public money on luxury projects, creating
dependence on state funding, distorting competition by privileging
local entrepreneurs over those from elsewhere in the country, spreading
funding too thinly, and for failing to create truly “endogenous devel-
opment”. Proponents typically described GIPs as fair and just com-
pensation, designed to promote acceptance [91]8 and prepare the re-
gion for the arrival of a project of national interest, yet allegations of
bribery were widespread [see also 65,92]. Opponents – mostly local
6 For example, Värmlandkraft OKG-delägarna, Mellansvensk kraft group.
7 Groupement d'intérêt public.
8 A view expressed also by Nicolas Lacroix, the President of Haute-Marne
departmental council, in a TV debate at France 3 Régions, "Dimanche en
Politique", 11 March 2018.
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NGOs – described the beneﬁt schemes as illegitimate albeit legal
bribery that has failed to generate the promised territorial develop-
ment. Some mayors supporting the project argued that GIPs indeed
were a form of bribery, but legitimate as such: ‘buying’ acceptance was
a fair way of compensating communities for their willingness to sacri-
ﬁce for the common good [cf. 68].
In Finland and Sweden, beneﬁt schemes are not legally mandatory,
yet Finnish nuclear municipalities receive substantial revenue in the
form of a property tax.9Almost a third of Eurajoki's tax revenue in 2010
came from the nuclear industry [28, p. 46]. Economic motives, desire to
gain an advantage over Loviisa in the rivalry for a planned new reactor,
and, according to local newspapers, pressure from TVO, helped ensure
municipal council's support for the repository project [21, pp. 176–184;
28]. The council successfully lobbied the government to provide a
higher property tax rate and specify this in legislation [21]. Commu-
nities hosting nuclear installations in France beneﬁt from similar tax
bonuses [93,65, p. 140] – in the case of Cigéo estimated at EUR 43
million/year on average – a total of EUR 5.5 billion over the planned
124-year (2020–2144) construction and operation period [94].
In the absence of property tax arrangements in Sweden, the muni-
cipalities negotiated with SKB, prior to the siting decision in 2009, the
so-called ‘value added programmes’, imposing these as an absolute
condition for their engagement.10 The programmes would provide a
total of SEK 2 billion (nearly EUR 200 million) of added value, from
2010 until the end of the construction period, via projects in education,
training, infrastructure, innovation, and business development [28].
The chosen host community would receive 25% of the funds, while
three-fourths would go to the ‘loser’. The schemes are governed jointly
by the municipalities and SKB, and, like in France, involve elaborate
arrangements to ensure that the money is spent appropriately and
generates added value [28]. A decade earlier, as part of siting nego-
tiations, the Finnish Eurajoki had negotiated with TVO and Posiva a
much more modest beneﬁt scheme [21, pp. 174–184]. The so-called
Vuojoki agreement was vital in ensuring the municipal council's sup-
port. Via the agreement, Posiva rented the Vuojoki Mansion from the
municipality for use as its headquarters, gave Eurajoki a loan of over
EUR 7 million, and helped it to establish a business development fund
and build an ice stadium [21, pp. 183–188]. Eurajoki essentially got
what it wanted: a new NPP, the associated tax revenue, and an addi-
tional beneﬁt scheme.
In Finland and Sweden, we could ﬁnd only two instances of bribery
allegations. Local opponents in Eurajoki argued that the Vuojoki
agreement aggravated the municipality's dependence on the power
company [21, pp. 184–188], while in Östhammar, opponents de-
nounced the use of beneﬁt money for ﬁnancing the municipality's day-
to-day statutory duties [95]. The relevant courts rejected the claims
ﬁled by opponents. It is notable that the bulk of attention and critique
in France concentrated on the mandatory and legally binding GIP
scheme, whereas critics less seldom evoked the support from the in-
dustry, which is voluntary but strongly encouraged by the state [92].
The waste producers (Areva, EDF, and CEA) have since 2006 provided
training to local businesses, investment loans, support to energy eﬃ-
ciency and renewable energy investments, and ﬁnancing to nuclear-
related high school curricula, worth a total of EUR 159.5 million in
2006–2016 [96].
The French and Finnish examples highlight the role of the state as a
key provider of economic legitimacy, whether via tax beneﬁts or legally
mandatory beneﬁt schemes. Several of our interviewees argued that,
given the state-led character of nuclear industry and the dirigiste
political culture in France, circulating industry money via a state-gov-
erned beneﬁt arrangement was the only legitimate option. One might
hypothesise that the critique in France was particularly vehement
partly because citizens tend to place greater expectations and ethical
norms upon the state than on private companies.
6.2. Socio-political legitimacy: state-guaranteed municipal veto,
transparency, and public consultations
SLO literature recognises the role of the state in establishing the
conditions for procedural justice and exerting pressure upon private
companies. In France, the government is generally seen as the only
legitimate guardian of the public interest [e.g. 97], and can decide on
the project alone, in principle even against the will of the aﬀected
numerous small communities [93, p. 55]. In Finland and Sweden, the
legally guaranteed veto right gave signiﬁcant leverage for the mu-
nicipalities in their negotiations with the industry and the project
owner. In Sweden, the host municipality's right to withdraw applies
until the very last stage of the siting process, but in Finland only until
the Decision-in-Principle [43]. In principle, even the Swedish govern-
ment can grant a construction licence without the municipality's con-
sent, in the name of national interest, but this is considered highly
unlikely [93, pp. 84–85].
Transparency is in Finland and Sweden grounded in the legislation,
dating back to the mid-18th century, which stipulates free access to
public documents [98]. Originally an oﬀspring of atomic weapons in-
dustry, the French nuclear energy sector suﬀers from a reputation of
secrecy and opacity [e.g. 72,71,99]. The state has over the years pushed
for transparency, responding to pressure from civil society, especially
since the controversy over the impacts of the Chernobyl accident [42,
pp. 63–75]. Transparency has since then become an enduring topic in
nuclear-sector debates in France, and is increasingly institutionalised in
legislative acts, multistakeholder bodies, and ‘counter-expertise’ orga-
nisations recognised by the state [e.g. 42,100].11 Eﬀorts at transparency
are set within the highly complex governance setting of the French
repository project, involving authorities, experts and multistakeholder
bodies at various levels of policymaking. However, critics - not only in
France, but also in Finland and Sweden - often describe transparency as
an excuse for the industry and project owners to drown citizens in in-
formation overﬂow and thereby conceal the essential [101,87,102].
Interviewed local project proponents and opponents blamed the state –
especially Andra – for withholding key information concerning the
socioeconomics of the project. Likewise, while legislation guarantees
access to public information, interviewed NGOs in Sweden as well as
academics in Finland have faced diﬃculties in accessing documents
produced by the private waste management and nuclear operators [26].
However, it is precisely the state-imposed norm of transparency that
has allowed this criticism to arise, by providing an ethical norm and
benchmark for private-sector practice.
Mandatory public consultations constituted another means of
ensuring transparency. The EIAs in Finland and Sweden and the CNDP
debates in France allowed waste management organisations to inform
citizens, and citizens to express their concerns [79,78,87,103]. This was
the case although these procedures are only advisory, and despite the
fact that only relatively small proportion of citizens participated.
However, the lack of clarity concerning the role of these processes in
decision-making engendered criticism. In Sweden, the two-track licen-
cing process, and the room for interpretation that it allows for key ac-
tors created confusion [87]: for construction and operating licences,
SKB needs approval from the Radiation Safety Authority, SSM, (under
the Act on Nuclear Activities) and from the Land and Environment
9 Municipalities are allowed to ﬁx a considerably higher tax rate on power
plants, including nuclear installations (3.1% in Eurajoki in 2018), than on other
industrial facilities (0.93-2% in 2018).
10 Interview with an SKB oﬃcial responsible for the community beneﬁts
schemes, 20 August 2013.
11 Explicitly reﬂected in regulatory acts and institutions such as the Act on
nuclear transparency and security (2006), and the High Commission for
Transparency and Information on Nuclear Security (HCTISN).
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Court, MMD (following the Environmental Code). The latter provides
unique transparency, as demonstrated by the multistakeholder hear-
ings, organised in spring 2017, whose procedural fairness was re-
cognised by all participants.12 The hearings led to further delays as the
Court required that SKB provide additional information [104].
Two state-led measures are essential in helping to advance proce-
dural justice by reducing resource asymmetries in Sweden. The Nuclear
Waste Fund (ﬁnanced by the nuclear reactor owners) channels sub-
stantial economic support to NGOs and municipalities for their review,
information and communication activities [93, pp. 91–93]. The Na-
tional Council for Nuclear Waste, a multidisciplinary expert advisory
body, organises independent evaluation and national-level public de-
bates and thereby helps to ensure the plurality of perspectives on NWM
[43]. Yet, NGOs have recently criticised the paucity of independent
research not ﬁnanced by the industry [105].
6.3. Interactional trust: the state (breaking its) promises, framing the
debates, and ensuring the respect for the spirit of the law
The interviewed French stakeholders at both local and national level
repeatedly evoked 'broken promises', notably those relating to the so-
cioeconomic beneﬁts of the project. Furthermore, while the Meuse and
Haute-Marne departments indeed volunteered in the mid-1990s to host
a URL, the way in which this volunteering then turned Bure to a re-
pository host, “almost by stealth” [65], generated discontent amongst
the locals, in the face of overwhelming state power. “We've been
conned”, a local mayor lamented. In Finland and Sweden, feelings of
deception seemed absent,13 and the industry and authorities underlined
the importance of continuous political commitment, patient and de-
termined long-term work towards implementation, following pre-
scribed steps and a realistic timetable [e.g. 106,107,60].
The legally mandatory consultations faced similar criticism in all
three countries: absence of alternatives (esp. the zero-option); alleged
attempts to wear out the opponents via endless consultations [101];
striking resource and information asymmetries between the project
owner and civil society actors; excessively technical and expert-led
framing; and the dominant role of the project owner in the process –
including the possibility to ignore critical questions [103,78,87,108, pp.
74–76; 82,66,109,74].
Two negative examples help to highlight the crucial role of the state.
First, in all three countries, citizens and stakeholders suspected the
mandatory consultations for being mere eﬀorts to legitimise decisions
already made, and regretted the exclusion of nuclear energy policy from
the debates. In France, the 2013–14 consultation turned into a farce, as
opponents prevented the public meetings from taking place. They la-
belled the consultations as “masquerade” and “a travesty of democ-
racy”, given that the necessity of the project could no longer be dis-
cussed [110, pp. 457–458]. CNDP hence decided to replace the
meetings by expert debates on the Internet. An interviewed Posiva of-
ﬁcial indirectly acknowledged the legitimating role of the Finnish EIA
consultations, noting that, as “sparring partners”, opponents helped the
company to strengthen its credibility and arguments [see 82 for similar
ﬁndings in Sweden]. Second, via the secretive Vuojoki community
beneﬁt agreement, Posiva eﬀectively selected Eurajoki as a host while
the EIA process was still underway [79,46,53,55,21]. This undermined
the EIA's role as the key forum for citizen participation [e.g. 78],14 and
betrayed the implicit promise that the EIA would inﬂuence decisions.
Both in Finland and in Sweden, stakeholders blamed the coordinating
EIA authority (Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs and Employment in Fin-
land; the state provincial authority in Sweden) for passiveness and
unwillingness to ensure that the project owner and the entire process
respect not only the letter but also the spirit of the law [21,87].
The processes crucial for interactional trust therefore include also
other stakeholders than the company and the community – most no-
tably the safety authority and other state authorities. In France, even
many opponents considered that the ﬁrst consultation (2005–06) or-
ganised by the National Commission on Public Debate (CNDP) en-
gendered trust in the CNDP as an independent and authoritative
guardian of fair and equal public engagement [103, p. 64]. The failed
2013–14 debate, by contrast, undermined trust in the CNDP [110, pp.
459–460].15 Also the French safety authorities have engaged in parti-
cipatory dialogue involving NGOs. However, the ‘Swedish model’ of
stakeholder dialogue, while anchored at the municipal level, probably
provides the clearest positive example of how the state actively helped
to build interactive trust. In the early 1990s, as Oskarshamn set up its
highly elaborate and participatory municipal organisation for dialogue
with SKB, the safety regulator initiated so-called ‘dialogue projects’
[84,82]. State support for municipalities and NGOs for their ‘counter-
expertise’ and communication activities, participatory review and
monitoring schemes [26], and the dialogical Environmental Court
hearings, all contributed to interactional trust. The two-track licencing
may have complicated the process, yet it also strengthened and speci-
ﬁed the role of environmental NGOs in the EIA, putting on a more equal
footing the competing paradigms of ‘planning’ and ‘precaution’ [87]. In
a way, trust-building reached beyond the Swedish borders, as SKB and
consulting ﬁrms transformed the dialogical approach into a new
Swedish ‘export product’, under the denomination of “Riscom model”
[e.g. 93,60,111].
6.4. Institutionalised trust shaped by the ambiguous and multidimensional
trust in the state
SLO literature has highlighted how citizens seldom are able and
willing to clearly distinguish between their views on a given project, the
company, and the industry in question [e.g. 15]. The relatively stable
'institutional' trust in the company and industry therefore shapes the
project-speciﬁc and more contingent SLO. In the NWM sector, the often
polarised views on nuclear energy play a vital role. However, more
general aspects of “ideological trust” [112,113] – perceptions con-
cerning the legitimate role of entities such as state, market, and com-
munity – decisively inﬂuence local-level SLO. These perceptions can
either foster or hamper the emergence of sentiments of pride, taken-for-
granted mutual trust, and shared interests between the community and
the NWM organisation.
In the Finnish and Swedish municipalities, the local populations
take special pride in hosting a repository, and a cognitive under-
standing of nuclear industry activities has been instilled into the local
culture [22]. Our interviews in France, by contrast, revealed rather a
situation of institutionalised mistrust, with entrenched and culturally
anchored 'us and them' relationships between the state and the local
actors. The interviews revealed similar tensions in relations between
Andra's Paris headquarters and its local oﬃce – the latter allegedly
more in tune with local views. Despite its eﬀorts to establish itself as a
recognised and respected actor in the region, Andra hardly appeared to
the locals as a ‘good buddy’, in the context of lacking municipal veto,
marginality of local-level actors in the governance of the beneﬁt
schemes (the state – via the local prefect – and the departmental
12 Personal communication by Arne Kaijser, an independent researcher pre-
sent at the hearings, 27 April 2018.
13 Despite a promise by TVO in 1980 that the “waste would not stay in
Eurajoki” – a promise that local opponents reminded about, but absent from the
collective memory.
14 An interviewed Posiva oﬃcial (1 June 2009) admitted that this “was
slightly embarrassing”, but added that the local politicians did not want to take
the risk that Posiva might choose another location.
15 The debate was largely considered as a failure, although Andra insisted on
declaring the debate as a success, as it allowed numerous exchanges that would
help further improve the project [110, p. 460].
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authorities hold a majority of votes suﬃcient to override even an un-
likely united front of mayors), and the state-centred politico-adminis-
trative tradition.
While not fully comparable with each other because of diﬀerences
in methodologies, surveys on citizen trust in repository safety and the
project owner provide clues on the role of broader state-related and
ideological aspects. Table 1 shows that in the Finnish Eurajoki, locals
have relatively low trust in repository safety (41%) and in the reliability
of the information provided by the project implementer, Posiva (57%),
as compared to the high local-level trust in France (78% and 63%, re-
spectively) and Sweden (86% and 76%).
The low trust ﬁgures in Eurajoki seem surprising in view of the
absence of critique, seemingly high satisfaction in economic and pro-
cedural legitimacy, and the scant concern that the citizens showed for
risk issues during the EIA [78, pp. 183–202]. This may partly be ex-
plained by the well-known reluctance of residents in nuclear commu-
nities to explicitly address risks, in a situation of economic dependence
on a possibly risky industry [e.g. 65]. For instance, in the French host
region, the locals acknowledge risks, but express conditional trust in the
safety experts, along the lines “it must be safe, because otherwise they
[experts and authorities] would not build a repository here”, or “I
think”, “I dare to hope” that the experts have examined all eventualities
[e.g. 117, pp. 37–38]. In both France and Finland, citizens express great
trust in the competence of experts, especially in their own country's
engineers [117, p. 37; 108]. French national-level surveys indeed show
high (76.5%) trust in the competence of the nuclear safety authorities
(ASN and IRSN), although trust in the willingness of these authorities to
tell the truth about nuclear risks (sincerity) – is only 40% for the
regulator (ASN) and 57% for the safety expert, IRSN [118, p. 129].
This is where a certain Finnish exceptionalism seems to come to
play: as many as 82% of citizens, both nationally and in Eurajoki, trust
in the safety authority as a source of information, i.e. its sincerity
[25,23,24]. In Eurajoki, this trust manifests itself in the municipality's
nearly symbiotic relationship with the companies essential for its
prosperity, and its willingness to fully delegate risk-related analysis to
the safety authority [43,26]. The shortcomings of the EIA in building
interactional trust [101,78,66] did little to undermine this trust and
silent acquiescence in the face of a project that the community saw as
indispensable for its socioeconomic wellbeing and survival. The two
Swedish host municipalities, by contrast, have taken a highly proactive
role, seeking to build independent competence also in safety matters
[43,26]. The Swedish municipalities transformed themselves from
“nuclear communities of fate“ [88, p. 41] into true NWM stakeholders
by actively forging their image and role as local ‘nuclear powers’ con-
scious of their bargaining power over SKB, which sorely needed a
willing host for the repository.
Institutionalisation of trust seemed to rely primarily on procedural
justice and interactional trust in the Swedish municipalities, while
economic legitimacy and deference to authority appeared as more
signiﬁcant in Eurajoki. Furthermore, in Östhammar, only 61% of the
citizens express trust in the regulator as source of information on nu-
clear-related issues [119], well below the Finnish 82%. Diﬀerences
concerning the nature of democracy in the two Nordic countries may go
some way towards explanation: the Finnish tradition tends to empha-
sise trust in state bureaucracy, and show tolerance to authoritarian
governance, while the Swedes esteem corporatist political representa-
tion and a democratic leadership style [120, p. 78; 121–123, pp.
22–26].
Local-level attitudes towards Andra and the repository project re-
vealed ambiguous perceptions concerning the role of the state in
France. The state appears at the same time as highly trusted (e.g. via the
‘public service’ tradition) and mistrusted (as a natural adversary of
grassroots and civil society action) [e.g. 97]. In France, the nuclear
sector represents a source of national pride, a symbol of the country's
modernisation and technological prowess [71], a signiﬁcant employer
and source of export revenue, but also a target of criticism as an al-
legedly secretive “Nuclear State” [99,42]. Ambiguities are arguably
even greater in the repository host region, with local imaginaries (re-
peatedly evoked in our interviews) deeply marked by the notion of a
“sacriﬁced land”, intentionally abandoned by the government as a
buﬀer zone against Germany during the war hostilities in the 19th and
20th centuries [e.g. 124]. And yet, the locals frequently called for the
state to take a more active role and lead the project with a ﬁrm hand.
Local project proponents sought to nurture the idea of pride for a na-
tionally vital project. In a region unfamiliar with the nuclear industry, it
seems diﬃcult to instigate the kind of pride that characterises
Table 1
Local-level trust in the safety of the repository and in the waste management
organisation as a source of information.
Sources: 25; 114; 115; 24; 116.
Eurajoki,
Finland
Bure region,
France
Östhammar region,
Sweden
Repository safety 41% 78% 86%
Implementer 57% 63% 76%
Table 2
Summary of the four criteria for obtaining an SLO, augmented with conditions applying to state actors.
Economic legitimacy Socio-political legitimacy Interactional trust Institutionalised trust
Distributive justice Procedural justice Competence, sincerity & responsiveness Full trust, psychological
identiﬁcation
• costs (including risks) and beneﬁts of
the project are shared in an equitable
manner within the community
• community beneﬁt schemes are
arranged in such a manner as not
to provide grounds for allegations
of illegitimate bribery
• the company and the relevant authorities are
open and transparent, as well as willing to
listen, demonstrate the project's social value,
and protect the community from harmful
impacts
• adequate legal and regulatory measures are
in place to ensure transparency, as well as
access to information, participation, and
justice
The company and the relevant state
authorities
• keep their promises• respond to citizen and stakeholder
concerns and views
• engage in mutual dialogue• respect local ways of life• share a similar vision of the future of
the region
• are competent, reliable and sincere in
implementing and regulating the
project (esp. risks and safety), and in
their communication
• ensure the respect for the spirit of the
law
• the project supports local
well-being
• community is proud of the
project and for taking
responsibility on behalf of the
rest of society
• the company, the state actors,
and community show mutual
regard for each other's interests
• the regulator is independent
and reliable
• the state is always there to
protect the community
against risks and harmful
impacts
• the company, state actors,
and community mutually
delegate duties to each other
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institutionalised trust. An interviewed French nuclear-sector profes-
sional referred to the Swedish example, asking with irony: “would you
ever imagine the French readily evoking the notion of responsibility for
the common good?”16
7. Conclusions: integrating the role of the state into SLO
frameworks
Via illustrative examples from nuclear waste repository projects in
three forerunner countries, this article has argued that SLO scholarship
and practice need to pay greater attention to the crucial role of the
state, if the SLO concept is to be truly useful in the area of NWM. The
state plays a pervasive and multifaceted role via its interest and in-
volvement in nuclear energy policy, via the complex ownership rela-
tions, and as a key actor in the governance of long-term risks and safety
– a central citizen concern in NWM. Unlike in most industry projects,
the state has a vested interest in ensuring a local-level SLO for a re-
pository, and sometimes (e.g. in France) even as the implementer of the
project. This underscores the asymmetries of power between the local
community and the actors seeking an SLO. Local communities have,
however, a degree of bargaining power. They can threaten to withdraw
or withhold an SLO, in a “mutual hostage situation”, as the NWM or-
ganisation depends on a willing host community, and needs to deliver
at least economic legitimacy [cf. 53, p. 218]. The NWM sector provides
a useful breeding ground for further development of SLO theory on the
role of the state in megaproject governance and energy-sector mega-
projects more generally.
Especially the highly complex multilevel governance setting in
France and the Swedish double-track licencing system illustrate the
heterogeneity of the state: the involved government bodies do not al-
ways act in concert towards a shared objective. The ‘us vs. them’ set-up
in the French case included contradictions between authorities at dif-
ferent levels, while the Swedish licencing system ultimately witnessed
the juxtaposition of two contrasting governance philosophies. Our ob-
servations echo earlier ﬁndings from SLO research concerning the
crucial articulation of ‘the project’ and ‘the local’ with the broader
national and international context [e.g. 14, p. 1064; 15], notably the
wider relations of trust and mistrust. This articulation is highly country-
and culture-speciﬁc, as are the statutory and perceived roles of the
state. The virtual absence of the SLO concept from the French discourse,
for instance, partly reﬂects the negative connotation that the associated
terms – acceptance and acceptability – have earned in this highly
conﬂict-oriented political culture.17
The framework of Boutilier and Thomson [12] oﬀers a useful basis
for further work, yet state-related criteria need to be integrated within
all of its four dimensions. The state is a major provider of economic
legitimacy, and local perceptions of community beneﬁt measures cru-
cially depend on the role of the state in steering those measures. Per-
ceptions concerning the state, in turn, inﬂuence the design of the
community schemes. The state – also through international cooperation
– establishes the setting for procedural justice and socio-political le-
gitimacy: companies and organisations need to be open and trans-
parent, as well as willing to listen and treat involved parties equally, yet
the government policies set the conditions for this to happen. As for
interactional trust, state actors can be active or passive in ensuring the
respect for the spirit of the law. The state has also a more direct role, as
the involved governmental actors need to keep their promises, integrate
the views of the citizens in decision-making, and, when appropriate,
actively facilitate dialogue. Ultimately, the degree to which trust be-
tween the nuclear waste repository operator and the local community
becomes institutionalised depends on broader ideological factors, no-
tably perceptions concerning the appropriate roles of the state, the
private sector, and local communities in governance processes. These
perceptions underpin public trust in state authorities – especially in
those responsible for safety.
Table 2 summarises the key conditions for the granting of an SLO,
based on the framework of Boutilier and Thomson, but augmented by
key state-related criteria evoked in this article (indicated in bold).
Bearing in mind that SLO is essentially about perceptions, the speciﬁc
criteria under the four headings refer to community perceptions, in-
stead of company declarations or presumably objective external criteria
of analysis.
Our analysis calls for caution concerning the assumption of trust as
the ultimate precondition for and an indicator of an SLO. In particular,
the complex interaction between trust and mistrust [e.g. 125,126] –
illustrated in particular by the French and Swedish cases – would de-
serve attention. Another aspect worth consideration in SLO scholarship
concerns the dynamics between trust in institutions and ideological
trust. For example, SLO and local-level interactional trust seemed to
have less importance for the advancement of the project in the French
state-centred setting than in the two Nordic cases, not least because of
the absence of a municipal veto. However, the advancement of French
project appears to depend on the solid ideological trust in the state and
its legitimacy as the guardian of the public interest. The kind of pas-
siveness observed in the Finnish case, including the municipality`s
willingness to fully delegate risk analysis to the safety authority [26],
seems to reﬂect the prevailing asymmetries of power. As such it may
reﬂect “overtrust” [127, p. 203] in institutions, and insuﬃcient vigi-
lance between parties that Lacey et al. have warned against [125, p.
24]. In the French context of seemingly all-encompassing mutual mis-
trust between actors, excessive ideological trust in the state may have
fed unrealistic expectations, feelings of disappointment and betrayal,
and thereby have further aggravated mistrust towards institutions.
Further research could usefully explore more in depth the potential
virtues of mistrust, the roles of the various (interpersonal, institutional
and ideological) dimensions of trust and mistrust, and the associated
exercise of power. Analysis could include systematic empirical cross-
country comparisons, which could not be carried out within the scope
of this study. It could also examine the issue of intergenerational jus-
tice, which is particularly acute in NWM, given the speciﬁc challenges
of extremely long-term radiation safety concerns, and – at slightly
shorter yet intergenerational timescales – in climate and energy policy.
The primacy of community approval as the ultimate foundation of an
SLO might therefore need to be revisited, and greater attention given to
the complex arbitration between public and private interests, at dif-
ferent temporal and spatial scales. The state plays various essential roles
in addressing such challenges of arbitration.
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